Artemis协议的背景与现状
Artemis协议是美国国家航空航天局（NASA）于2020年发起的一系列原则，旨在为月球等深空的探索与利用建立一个透明、和平和可持续的规则框架https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-does-china-think-about-nasas-artemis-accords/。该协议并非新的国际条约，而是建立在《外空条约》等现有国际法基础上的政治承诺 。签署国承诺在太空活动中加强透明度、互操作性、紧急援助、登记物体、科学数据共享、保护人类遗产、资源利用、安全区以及太空碎片治理等方面进行合作https://medium.com/@karmanlineblog/space-law-in-the-coalition-era-artemis-accords-vs-ilrs-4f3ca320390a。自2020年8个创始国签署以来，Artemis协议成员不断增加。截至2026年1月，已有超过61个国家签署了该协议，2024年底时为50国，2025年中增至逾55国https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/chinas-steady-ascent-to-the-moon-how-beijing-is-rewriting-lunar-geopolitics/。这表明Artemis协议已迅速成为全球太空探索治理的重要多边框架之一。
中国的立场与质疑
中国并未加入Artemis协议，对其始终保持审慎和质疑态度。由于美国法律（如2011年的“Wolf修正案”）限制NASA与中国直接合作，中国在Artemis协议制定过程中被排除在外https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-does-china-think-about-nasas-artemis-accords/。中国官方和媒体将Artemis协议视作美国主导太空秩序的举措，担心其带有排他性和地缘政治意图。中国军事航天领域评论员宋忠平将该协议比作18世纪英国的“圈地运动”，认为美国试图通过Artemis在太空开启“殖民圈地”，变相宣示月球主权 。中国官媒《环球时报》也批评美国抱持冷战思维，企图利用Artemis协议来压制中俄的太空雄心 。此外，中国观察家指出Artemis协议由美国单方面发起，未充分协商，就单边制定了月球资源开发规则，可能违反“不占有”原则等国际法基本精神 。中国外交部发言人甚至直言，Artemis协议有建立“太空版北约”的意味，是一个具有排他性质的俱乐部 。相较而言，中俄倡议的国际月球科研站（ILRS）则宣称秉持开放包容、造福全人类的合作理念，强调构建人类命运共同体在太空领域的实践 。
值得注意的是，中国法律和航天专家对Artemis协议的态度并非铁板一块。一些中国学者承认深空资源开发确需国际框架，Artemis协议提出的许多原则（如人道救援、空间碎片减缓等）与中国已参与的国际公约和自身实践相符 。但由于该协议带有强烈的美方主导色彩，又未纳入中俄等主要航天国家，中国整体上对其保持警惕，担心这是美国在太空对华**合围（encirclement）**的组成部分 。月球对于中国的太空战略意义重大（例如嫦娥系列和载人登月计划），Artemis协议恰在中国关键航天节点推出，更加深了中方疑虑 。
Artemis协议扩员对中国的潜在影响
随着越来越多国家加入Artemis协议，美国主导的太空规则体系日益壮大，其对中国的影响体现在多个方面：
国际规范与话语权：Artemis协议成员的激增使美国在月球活动规范制定上占据主导地位。大量国家通过双边合作接受并践行Artemis原则，将加速其演变为国际惯例和行为准则 。这可能削弱中国在未来月球治理规则讨论中的话语权。如果大多数国家都认可并遵循Artemis框架下的规则，中国即便不签署，也可能不得不在实践中被动接受这些规范，否则将被视为“不守规则”。换言之，美国正通过Artemis联盟“抢跑”太空法律的习惯法塑造，而中国在这一过程中相对缺席。
外交局面与伙伴关系：Artemis联盟的扩大可能造成中国在太空外交上的相对孤立。许多传统上与中国友好的国家也可能因为美国的影响力而选择加入Artemis阵营，从而减少与中国深空合作的动力。当前Artemis协议签署国与中国倡议的ILRS成员几乎泾渭分明——除泰国曾同时涉足两个倡议外，尚无Artemis国家加入ILRS，而ILRS的13个伙伴国（包括俄罗斯、巴基斯坦、白俄罗斯、南非等）也无一签署Artemis协议 。这表明一旦国家加入Artemis协议，可能倾向于围绕美国开展深空合作，而不参与中俄主导的平台。中国潜在的国际合作伙伴选择空间被压缩：一些航天新兴国家面对美中两大框架，可能认为Artemis渠道能提供更多资源和技术支持，从而疏远中国。这无疑增加了中国拓展太空国际合作的难度和成本。
资源开发与法律风险：Artemis协议明确支持私营和政府主体在不改变“不占有”原则前提下进行月球资源开采，并倡议建立“安全区”以避免干扰冲突 。美方称这是落实《外空条约》避免有害干涉义务的务实举措，但批评者（包括中国专家）担忧：如果由一国集团单方面划定月面“安全区”，实质上可能演变为事实上的排他性影响区，近似于变相领土主张 。随着Artemis成员扩增，这种关于资源利用权和活动范围的话语权之争对中国非常不利。将来若大部分国家默认了Artemis框架下的资源开采模式，中国自行开展月球采矿或建立基地时，可能面临“违反国际规范”的舆论压力，甚至在法律上陷入被动。此外，竞争加剧下的无序开采风险也上升：若缺乏中美共同参与的全球机制，双方可能各自推进资源利用计划，增加规则碰撞和潜在冲突的可能性 。
太空竞争与安全：Artemis联盟被美国政界渲染为对抗中国太空雄心的关键手段，随着成员壮大，这种新冷战式的太空竞赛氛围更强烈。在美国，NASA局长等高官多次以“中国威胁论”为由号召支持Artemis计划，强调唯有率先重返月球才能在新一轮太空竞赛中击败中国 。这种氛围推动美国国会持续为Artemis提供资金和政策支持，也逼使中国加速其太空计划以免在国际舆论和进度上处于下风。例如，中国已宣布2030年前实现首次载人登月，并在加紧研发新一代登月火箭长征十号和月面核能供电等关键技术 。竞速心理可能导致双方都投入更多资源于太空项目，增加财政负担和技术风险。此外，随着两大阵营各自部署绕月通信、导航卫星和航天器，一个“平行且互不隶属的月球基础设施”正在形成 。亚洲一些安全分析人士已表达担忧：如果美中在月球及其轨道上建立各自的通信导航网络且缺乏协调，这些重叠的空间基础设施可能引发干扰、误判甚至对抗风险 。太空活动军事化的隐忧也会上升——双方都不愿对方在月球取得战略前置地位。可以说，Artemis扩员在客观上加剧了中美在太空的战略博弈和安全两难。
中国的应对策略
面对Artemis协议不断扩大的影响力和由此带来的挑战，中国需要制定综合策略予以应对，以维护自身在太空领域的权益和主导权。主要应对思路包括：
倡导多边主义，强化联合国框架：中国应积极利用联合国和平利用外层空间委员会（COPUOS）等多边平台，倡导由所有国家共同参与的月球治理规则讨论。通过推动在联合国框架下讨论月球活动准则（例如资源开发、避免冲突、安全区定义等），中国可争取将自身理念纳入国际议程，避免规则被Artemis成员单方面“先行定义”。这种做法与中国长期外交主张一致，即反对太空领域出现排他性集团，主张外空资源是人类共同财产、应遵循“广泛协商、共同受益”的原则 。在这一思路下，中国可呼吁就月球活动制定新的国际法律文书（类似当年的《月球协定》，但汲取其未获广泛接受的教训），或者推动通过联合国决议确认若干基本原则，以缓和Artemis框架可能带来的碎片化趋势。
加快推进国际月球科研站（ILRS）计划：作为回应，美国有Artemis联盟，中国则联手俄罗斯等提出了ILRS合作倡议。中国应继续把ILRS作为主要抓手，打造自身的国际合作平台。一方面，要细化并公开ILRS的合作原则和章程，向国际社会证明其遵循《外空条约》“非占有”等精神，不是另一个封闭小圈子（目前ILRS的具体准则尚未公开，需避免外界误解其合法性和透明度 ）。另一方面，要扩大ILRS“朋友圈”：通过外交努力和实质优惠吸引更多国家加入ILRS网络。中国已经提出“5-5-5”计划，即到2030年代让50个国家、500家机构、5000名科研人员参与月球科研合作 。为实现这一目标，中国可提供多种激励措施，例如为伙伴国建设深空测控站提供低息贷款，向合作国转让部分航天技术，并在嫦娥系列月球任务中预留搭载实验载荷的机会 。这种在航天领域的互利举措类似于“一带一路”倡议在地面上的模式，被视为提高合作伙伴黏性的有效手段 。通过扩大ILRS的参与国范围（截至2025年已吸引17个国家或机构意向合作 ），中国可以削弱Artemis联盟的垄断性影响，形成**“双轨并行”**的月球合作格局，在规则制定上与美方抗衡。
坚持开放透明，寻求原则交集：尽管身处不同阵营，中国应尽量在实际行动上对标国际最佳实践，展现负责任大国形象。这包括提高自身探月和空间活动的透明度，及时公布任务计划和科学数据，继续遵守《救助宇航员协定》等国际义务，同时执行严格的航天器碰撞预防和太空碎片减缓措施 。事实上，Artemis协议所提倡的许多行为规范（公开科学数据、紧急互助、历史遗产保护等）并非美国独有的要求，而是对已有国际准则的具体化 。中国可以主动对外强调：这些理念在很大程度上与中国一直支持的原则一致，中国同样致力于和平和可持续的太空开发。通过凸显共通点，中方可减少外界对其“不遵守规则”的疑虑。在条件成熟时，如果Artemis联盟开展关于月球活动规则的国际对话（如工作组讨论“安全区”操作规范），中国可考虑以观察员或非正式方式参与讨论，贡献建设性意见，避免被规则演进甩在身后。
灵活开展跨阵营合作，避免全面对抗：即便在Artemis框架下，中国仍有机会与部分签署国进行务实合作。科技合作不一定完全按照政治阵营划线：例如，即使法国、意大利、瑞典、瑞士等国签署了Artemis协议，它们仍向中国后续的嫦娥六号、七号探测器提供了载荷设备，在科学层面展开合作 。泰国和塞内加尔等国更是同时出现在中美两大倡议中，选择双边平衡策略 。中国应鼓励这种“双重参与”模式，欢迎Artemis签署国以项目合作方式参与ILRS或中国探月任务，并 reciprocally 表示愿意在科研数据、工程标准上与Artemis各国沟通对接。通过点状合作积累互信，既可避免美中在月球事务上陷入零和对抗，又能使双方技术体系逐步形成一定兼容，为未来更广泛的国际合作留下余地。此外，中国还可以与欧洲航天局（ESA）等保持沟通。尽管ESA成员国多已签署Artemis协议，但ESA作为整体并未正式加入某一阵营，中国与ESA在探月、深空探测上的合作潜力仍在（如月球科研、空间科学等领域的协同），这些都应积极拓展。
提升自主创新能力，巩固竞争优势：面对激烈竞争，中国最根本的应对之策是做好自己的事，在关键航天技术和任务上保持领先或并跑地位。只有自身具备强大的深空探测和利用能力，中国在国际谈判中才有底气和筹码。近年来中国在月球探测领域的投入已结出硕果：嫦娥五号实现月壤采样返回，嫦娥六号又将首次取回月球背面样品 ；新一代载人飞船和登月舱试验成功，载人登月计划进展顺利，目标直指2030年前登陆月球 。同时，中国也在推进月球科研站关键技术预研，包括月面核能供电、原位资源利用(ISRU)、重型运载火箭等 。这些努力表明中国有能力自主开拓月球，这将吸引那些有探月需求但技术能力有限的国家向中国靠拢合作。继续加强研发和投入，确保嫦娥后续任务与载人登月工程按计划实施，是中国在太空竞赛中立于不败之地的基础。只要中国自身的探月计划取得实质性领先成果（例如率先在月极建立可持续基地），那么即便未加入Artemis协议，中国也能在未来国际月球秩序中掌握更大的主动权。换言之，以实力塑造规则，在竞争中赢得尊重和发言权，是应对Artemis联盟扩张的长远之道。
结语
Artemis协议签署国不断增加，确立了由美国牵头的月球探索“同盟”，这对中国既是挑战也是机遇。一方面，中国需警惕太空治理被少数国家主导而自身被边缘化的风险，积极采取外交和技术手段予以化解；另一方面，多国竞逐月球也推动中国加速创新和对外合作新模式。展望未来，月球及深空的规则制定应是包容的多边过程。中国有必要坚持自身的发展道路，同时张开臂膀，以开放合作的姿态融入全球太空事业。在维护《外空条约》核心原则的基础上，中方可以通过倡导“人类命运共同体”的理念，提供一个不同于Artemis但兼容并蓄的公共产品。只有避免阵营对立、加强沟通协商，才能确保未来月球探索走上和平共赢的轨道。中国应在竞合并存的新太空时代中，把握机遇，化解挑战，为人类共同的太空未来贡献力量 。
参考来源： NASA官网、美国物理学会、外交学者、《环球时报》英文版、美国国务院、外交政策分析评论等 等。上述英文资料为分析提供了事实依据和多角度视角，涵盖了Artemis协议原则、签署国动态，以及国际社会对此的不同解读和反应。本文在此基础上进行了归纳和阐述。
Artemis Accords Signatory Countries: Comparative Analysis (截至2026年1月)
本文对截至2026年1月签署《阿耳忒弥斯协定》（Artemis Accords）的所有国家进行深入分析。分析维度包括：民用航天技术能力、军事航天能力、参与阿耳忒弥斯计划程度、与美国太空政策的契合度，以及与中国在航天领域的双边关系。以下提供中英双语对比表格和中文总结报告，并附上原始英文资料来源。
Comparative Table of Artemis Accords Signatories (Chinese–English Bilingual)
| 国家 (Country) | 民用航天技术能力 Civil Space Tech Capacity | 军事航天能力 Military Space Capability | 参与Artemis任务情况 Participation in Artemis | 与美国太空政策契合度 Alignment with U.S. Space Policy | 与中国航天关系 Relations with China |
| 美国 (United States) | 拥有全球最强的民用航天能力：美国国家航空航天局（NASA）具备全面的深空探索计划，并带动了发达的商业航天产业 。私营公司（如SpaceX、Blue Origin等）的快速发展使美国在火箭发射、人类航天和卫星应用等方面保持领先。 The United States possesses the world’s most advanced civil space capabilities, with NASA conducting ambitious deep-space exploration programs and fostering a vibrant commercial space industry . A booming private sector (e.g. SpaceX, Blue Origin) contributes to U.S. leadership in launch, human spaceflight, and satellite applications. | 全球最强军事航天力量：美军设立了独立的太空军，部署有全球导航卫星GPS和天基导弹预警网等关键资产，并发展了反卫星和电子战能力。美国是少数进行过反卫星（ASAT）试验的国家之一，甚至已在轨部署可干扰敌方卫星通信的系统 。这些能力确保美军在太空领域的主导地位。 The U.S. is the world’s leading military space power. It has established an independent Space Force and operates critical assets like the GPS constellation and space-based missile warning systems. The U.S. is one of the few nations to have conducted anti-satellite (ASAT) tests and reportedly has on-orbit systems capable of jamming adversary satellites , underscoring its dominant defense posture in space. | 阿耳忒弥斯计划的发起与核心：美国主导并启动了阿耳忒弥斯登月计划，提供“太空发射系统”（SLS）火箭和“猎户座”载人飞船等主要硬件，目标是在2027年前后实现人类重返月球 。作为计划牵头方，美国负责协调国际合作，并将其宇航员（包括联盟国宇航员）送入绕月和登月任务（例如阿耳忒弥斯II、III号等）。 The U.S. initiated and is the core leader of the Artemis program, providing key hardware such as the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and Orion spacecraft to return humans to the Moon by around 2027 . As the lead partner, the U.S. coordinates international contributions and will send its astronauts (and those of allies) on lunar orbit and surface missions (e.g. Artemis II, III). | 制定并引领太空政策规范：美国通过《阿耳忒弥斯协定》倡导其太空活动原则（透明、和平用途等），并要求伙伴遵循 。同时，美国国内以2011年“沃尔夫修正案”等法律禁止与中国官方航天合作，体现出与中国彻底脱钩的政策取向 。总体而言，美国自身即为太空政策的制定者，其盟友多追随其倡议。 The U.S. sets and leads global space norms. Through the Artemis Accords it promotes principles like transparency and peaceful use, expecting partners to adhere . Domestically, laws like the 2011 Wolf Amendment bar NASA–China cooperation, reflecting a deliberate policy of decoupling from China’s space program . As the primary architect of these norms, the U.S. sees broad support for its initiatives among allies. | 竞争与隔绝：美国将中国视为主要太空竞争对手，基本没有官方合作。通过法律和政策，美国为自身与中国之间构筑起“防火墙”，阻止中国参与国际空间站等项目 。中国官方和媒体则批评阿耳忒弥斯协定是美国谋求太空主导权的工具，称其为太空版“圈地运动” 。当前美中在月球基地、深空探测等方面呈现出两套平行且竞争的体系（阿耳忒弥斯 vs 国际月球科研站）。 The U.S. treats China as a primary space rival and has virtually no official cooperation with Beijing’s space program. U.S. laws and policies create a “firewall” between the two (e.g. barring China from the ISS) . Chinese officials and media criticize the Artemis Accords as a tool for U.S. space hegemony, likening it to an “enclosure movement” in space . Essentially, the U.S. and China lead parallel, competing initiatives in lunar and deep-space exploration (Artemis vs. ILRS). |
| 英国 (United Kingdom) | 老牌航天参与国，商业创新活跃：英国拥有宇航局（UKSA）并参与欧洲航天局(ESA)计划，在卫星制造、遥感、通信等领域具备实力。近年来英国扶持商业航天（如小型发射器研发、OneWeb卫星通信等）。尽管缺乏自主载人/重型发射能力，英国的航天产业在欧洲占重要地位。 The UK is a long-standing space-faring nation (via the UK Space Agency and ESA) with strengths in satellite manufacturing, remote sensing, and communications. In recent years, it has fostered commercial space innovation (e.g. small launch vehicles, OneWeb constellation). The UK lacks independent human launch or heavy lift rockets, but its space industry is a major player in Europe. | 构建军航能力，注重太空安全：英国成立了国防太空司令部（2021年）并投入约14亿英镑加强军用太空项目 。英国拥有军用通信卫星Skynet系列，以及计划中的多卫星情报侦察系统以支持情报与监视 。作为“五眼”联盟成员，英军与美等共享太空监视数据，并开发太空态势感知和抗干扰技术。 The UK is expanding its military space capabilities, establishing UK Space Command (2021) and committing £1.4 billion to military space programs . It operates Skynet military communications satellites and is developing a multi-satellite system for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance . As a Five Eyes member, the UK shares space surveillance data with allies and is developing space domain awareness and anti-jamming technologies. | 通过欧盟和双边途径参与：英国作为阿耳忒弥斯创始签署国之一（2020年） ，其贡献主要体现在通过欧洲航天局对Artemis硬件的支持（例如参与猎户座服务舱开发）。此外，英国公司也参与月球探测配套项目（如计划中的“登月通信导航”卫星）。英国未来可能寻求本国宇航员参与Artemis相关任务。 The UK, a founding Artemis Accords signatory (2020) , participates primarily via ESA contributions to Artemis hardware (e.g. the Orion service module). UK industry is also involved in supporting projects (for instance, planned lunar communication/navigation satellites). The UK may in future seek to have its own astronauts on Artemis-related missions. | 高度契合美国太空主张：作为美国紧密盟友，英国在太空法规与安全议题上与美立场一致。英国支持美国倡导的太空行为规范（如签署防止反卫星试验承诺，推动太空可持续倡议） 。英国脱离欧盟后更加重视与美国的双边太空合作，包括签署《太空态势感知协定》等，与美共同维护太空秩序。 The UK’s space policy is closely aligned with the U.S. As a key ally, Britain echoes U.S. positions on space norms and security, supporting initiatives like the ban on destructive ASAT tests and space sustainability measures . Post-Brexit, the UK has placed greater emphasis on bilateral space cooperation with the U.S. (e.g. agreements on space situational awareness), jointly upholding rules-based order in space. | 有限合作，日益疏远：早期英中在空间科学上曾有一些合作尝试，但近年由于安全关切关系转冷。英国已禁止在关键航天通信等领域使用中国技术，并严格审查中国资本。英政府明确将中国定位为战略竞争对手，其太空计划倾向与美国等同盟协作，而基本不参与中国主导的项目。 UK–China space interactions have been limited and have cooled in recent years over security concerns. The UK has barred Chinese technology in critical communications satellites and scrutinizes Chinese investments. With China defined as a “strategic competitor,” Britain prefers to collaborate with the U.S. and allies in space and has abstained from Chinese-led initiatives. |
| 加拿大 (Canada) | 综合航天实力强，商业部门活跃：加拿大航天局（CSA）历史悠久，擅长航天机器人（如机械臂“加拿大臂”系列）和卫星通信/遥感技术。加拿大无自主载人发射能力，但通过与NASA合作实现宇航员飞行。商业方面，加拿大公司在卫星通信、对地观测和空间机器人等领域具有竞争力（如MDA公司开发机械臂和雷达卫星）。 Canada has a well-rounded space program and a vibrant industry. The Canadian Space Agency (CSA) is known for robotics (the Canadarm series) and satellite communications/remote sensing. Canada lacks domestic human launch capability but flies astronauts via partnership with NASA. Its space companies excel in communications, Earth observation, and robotics (e.g. MDA’s robot arms and RADARSAT satellites). | 军事航天能力有限但重要：加拿大将太空视为国防辅助领域，拥有“萨菲尔”（Sapphire）空间监视卫星等，用于太空态势感知。加军没有独立反卫星武器，但通过NORAD与美共享导弹预警及监视数据。其雷达卫星（如RADARSAT-2/3）支持国防和安全用途。2022年起加军成立太空部门，加强卫星通信、情报监视等能力，与美军太空司令部紧密协作。 Canada’s military space capabilities are modest but strategically significant. Canada operates a space surveillance satellite (Sapphire) for space domain awareness and relies on NORAD partnership with the U.S. for missile warning and space tracking. It has no dedicated ASAT weapons, but its RADARSAT Earth observation satellites support defense and security tasks. Since 2022, the Canadian Armed Forces have established a space division to enhance satellite communications and ISR, working closely with U.S. Space Command. | Artemis计划核心伙伴：加拿大是创始签约国之一，在Artemis中扮演重要角色 。CSA提供了“加拿大臂3”智能机械臂用于月球门户（Gateway）空间站，并因此获得阿耳忒弥斯II号任务上由加拿大宇航员执行任务的机会 。加拿大亦参与月球表面探测技术开发，其工业承包商积极参与NASA月球载荷项目。 Canada, a founding Artemis signatory, is a key partner . CSA is contributing the advanced “Canadarm3” robotic arm for the Lunar Gateway, securing a seat for a Canadian astronaut on the Artemis II mission . Canada is also involved in lunar surface exploration technology and its contractors are engaged in NASA lunar payload initiatives. | 坚定奉行美加太空合作：作为美国邻国和盟友，加拿大长期与NASA紧密合作，其太空政策高度契合美方倡议。加拿大是最早响应美国倡议承诺不进行破坏性反卫星试验的国家之一 。在外交场合，加拿大支持以《外层空间条约》为基础并由志同道合国家推进的规范 。总体而言，加拿大在太空治理上与美国步调一致。 Canada’s space policy is closely aligned with the U.S., reflecting decades of NASA–CSA collaboration. Canada was among the first to join the U.S. pledge against destructive ASAT tests . Diplomatically, Canada advocates for norms grounded in the Outer Space Treaty and advanced by like-minded nations . In space governance and security, Canada consistently operates in lockstep with the United States. | 与中国合作几乎中断：冷战后加拿大曾与中国有少量航天合作尝试（例如早期加中科学载荷交换），但近年来因地缘政治紧张和涉孟晚舟事件等，两国航天往来降至最低。加拿大在敏感技术上对华采取严格管制，其航天企业亦无重大对华合作项目。可以说，加拿大当前基本站在美国一边，对中国航天持谨慎甚至隔离态度。 Canadian–Chinese space cooperation is virtually nonexistent at present. In earlier years there were minor collaborations (e.g. exchange of scientific instruments), but diplomatic strains (e.g. the Meng Wanzhou case) have halted most interaction. Canada tightly controls sensitive technology exports to China, and Canadian space firms have no significant partnerships in China. Essentially, Canada has sided with the U.S., maintaining a cautious, arm’s-length stance toward China’s space efforts. |
| 日本 (Japan) | 亚洲航天强国，技术全面：日本宇宙航空研究开发机构（JAXA）拥有自主发射能力（H-IIA/B火箭等）和丰富的科学探测成果（如“隼鸟”小行星取样、“希望”号火星卫星等）。日本在航天器研发、月球与行星探测、空间机器人等方面世界领先，商业航天产业也逐步兴起。 Japan is a leading space power in Asia with comprehensive capabilities. JAXA has indigenous launch systems (H-IIA/B, the new H3) and notable science missions (e.g. Hayabusa asteroid sample return, the “Hope” Mars orbiter in cooperation with UAE). Japan excels in spacecraft engineering, lunar and planetary probes, and robotics, and its commercial space sector is growing. | 军事航天稳步扩充：日本近年建立“宇宙作战队”等自卫队太空部队（2020年设立）以监视太空目标。日本拥有情报收集卫星网（光学和雷达卫星）用于军事侦察，并计划部署卫星星座提升导弹预警和通信能力。虽受和平宪法限制，日本不发展进攻性太空武器，但注重防御性太空技术，如反干扰、太空态势感知和卫星导航增强 。日本也加入了避免ASAT试验的承诺 。 Japan has been steadily bolstering its military space posture. A Space Operations Squadron (est. 2020) monitors space objects and protects satellites. Japan fields an Information Gathering Satellite constellation (optical & radar) for military reconnaissance and is planning satellite networks for missile warning and secure communications. While constrained by its pacifist constitution from developing offensive space weapons, Japan invests in defensive capabilities such as anti-jamming, space situational awareness, and enhanced navigation services . Japan also pledged not to conduct destructive ASAT tests . | Artemis计划主要伙伴：日本于2020年签署协定，作为核心伙伴之一参与Artemis 。JAXA承诺提供月球门户（Gateway）的居住舱部件（I-Hab，与ESA合作）和生命维持系统，并将使用H3火箭及HTV-X货运飞船为Gateway运输物资。日美还同意未来日本宇航员将登上Gateway，并有机会登月。日本2022年派遣“Omotenashi”小型着陆器搭乘Artemis I（虽未成功）等，体现深度参与。 Japan, an Artemis Accords signatory since 2020, is a primary partner in the Artemis program . JAXA is contributing elements for the Lunar Gateway (the I-Hab habitation module in cooperation with ESA, life-support systems) and plans to use its H3 rocket and HTV-X cargo craft to resupply the Gateway. The U.S. has agreed that Japanese astronauts will crew the Gateway and likely set foot on the Moon on later Artemis missions. Japan’s involvement was evident in Artemis I (which carried JAXA’s small lander “Omotenashi”, though its mission was not fully successful), underscoring Japan’s deep commitment. | 高度契合美国太空战略：日美在太空领域有长期盟友合作关系，日本在太空安全和规则制定上与美国立场一致。日本在联合国等场合支持由美倡导的太空行为准则，并与美签署太空态势感知、导航增强等双边协定。作为“四方安全对话”(Quad)成员，日本与美印澳推进太空合作以应对共同挑战。总体而言，日本视美日同盟为其太空活动基石。 Japan’s space policy is tightly aligned with the U.S., reflecting a decades-long alliance in space endeavors. Japan echoes U.S. positions on space security and norms in international fora and has entered bilateral agreements with the U.S. on SSA data sharing, GPS augmentation, etc. As part of the Quad (with the U.S., India, Australia), Japan is enhancing cooperative space efforts to address mutual challenges. The U.S.–Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of Japan’s space activities. | 竞争多于合作：由于战略和安全因素，日本与中国的航天关系冷淡。双方在政府层面几乎无实质合作；日本也未参与中国空间站或月球项目。相反，日本在地区航天竞争中与中国呈现竞逐态势（如探月、火星探测领域）。日本科学界曾与中方有小规模合作（如共享卫星数据等），但在当前政治环境下趋于减少。日本日益将中国视为太空竞争对手，在本国政策中加强应对。 Japan’s space relationship with China is characterized more by competition than cooperation. There is virtually no significant government-to-government collaboration—Japan has not joined China’s space station or lunar projects. Instead, the two are often seen vying in areas like lunar and Mars exploration. Some limited scientific exchanges (e.g. satellite data sharing) have occurred, but these have waned amid geopolitical tensions. Japan increasingly views China as a strategic competitor in space and is orienting its policies accordingly. |
| 澳大利亚 (Australia) | 新兴航天国家，商用与科研并举：澳大利亚近年成立航天局（ASA，2018年），重点发展卫星应用、地面基础设施和商业航天。澳拥有南半球重要的深空通信站，并培育小型发射和卫星公司。凭借在机器人与矿业技术方面的优势，澳大利亚正开发月表小型漫游车等探索技术 。总体而言，其民用航天实力在快速提升。 Australia is a re-emerging space nation with a new space agency (est. 2018) focusing on satellites, ground infrastructure, and commercial space. It hosts key Southern Hemisphere deep-space communication facilities and is nurturing domestic launch and satellite companies. Leveraging strengths in robotics and mining tech, Australia is developing a small lunar rover and other exploration technologies . Its civil space capabilities are on a fast upswing. | 注重太空安全投入：澳大利亚于2022年组建国防太空司令部，并宣布未来十年投入约90-120亿澳元用于太空国防 。目前重点加强军事通信、空间态势感知(SSA)和电子战等能力。澳与美国深度合作，参与美国的太空监视网络（在澳设有雷达、光学望远镜），并购买美制卫星通信服务以满足国防需要。无进攻性太空武器计划，但其广袤领土使之成为美盟太空监测和导弹预警的重要一环。 Australia established a Defence Space Command in 2022 and pledged AUD $9–12 billion over the next decade to boost defense space capabilities . It is focused on enhancing military satellite communications, space situational awareness, and electronic warfare. Australia works closely with the U.S., hosting American space tracking radars and telescopes and participating in the U.S.-led space surveillance network. It also invests in U.S. satellite communications (e.g. as a partner in the Wideband Global SATCOM system) for defense needs. Australia has no plans for offensive space weapons, but its vast territory makes it a critical part of allied space monitoring and missile warning architectures. | Artemis合作紧密：作为协定首发签署国之一，澳大利亚积极参与Artemis相关任务 。澳航天局与NASA签署协议，将由澳方研制一台月球小型漫游车参与未来Artemis登月任务，预计2026年前后送往月球，以协助采集月壤供资源利用实验 。此外，澳深空测控站将支持Artemis飞控通信。澳科学家也参与月球科研团队。总体而言，澳利用其技术和地理优势，为Artemis提供独特贡献。 As an original signatory, Australia is deeply involved in Artemis . NASA and the Australian Space Agency agreed on an Australian-developed small lunar rover to be included on a future Artemis mission – potentially around 2026 – to collect lunar soil for in-situ resource utilization experiments . Australia’s deep-space ground stations will also support Artemis mission communications and tracking. Australian researchers are contributing to lunar science teams. In sum, Australia is leveraging its technical and geographic strengths to make unique contributions to Artemis. | 与美政策高度一致：澳大利亚作为美国盟国，在太空政策上与美高度契合，包括支持美国提出的规则和倡议。澳承诺不进行破坏性反卫星试验，并加入美日印澳“四方”机制的太空合作框架，共同推动基于规则的太空秩序。澳美还签署太空监视协定，分享太空物体跟踪数据。可以说，澳大利亚的太空战略几乎与美国同步。 Australia’s space policy is closely aligned with the U.S. As a U.S. ally, Canberra supports American-led norms and initiatives. Australia has pledged to refrain from destructive ASAT tests and participates in the Quad’s space cooperation framework to promote a rules-based order in space. The U.S. and Australia have an SSA sharing agreement to exchange tracking data. In essence, Australia’s space strategy operates almost in lockstep with that of the United States. | 由合作转向竞争：过去澳中在航天领域有一定合作（如澳曾允许中国使用其地面站支持嫦娥探月），但近年因地缘关系恶化而中止 。2020年起澳方不再续约中国使用澳西深空站的协议，限制了中国北斗等项目的海外站点 。澳官方将中国太空活动视为潜在威胁，与美共同警惕。总体上，当前澳中航天关系冷淡，澳更倾向与美国等盟友合作，对中国项目则保持距离。 Australia’s earlier space cooperation with China (e.g. permitting use of an Australian ground station for China’s lunar missions) has given way to a more adversarial stance as bilateral relations soured . In 2020, Australia declined to renew China’s access to a satellite tracking station in Western Australia, curbing Chinese Beidou and other space operations on Australian soil . Canberra increasingly views Chinese space activities as potential threats and coordinates with the U.S. to counter them. In summary, Australia now favors alliances with the U.S. and partners, keeping a distance from Chinese space projects. |
| 意大利 (Italy) | 欧洲航天强国，工业基础雄厚：意大利拥有成熟的航天工业和研究机构，是欧洲航天局(ESA)主要参与国之一。意大利在卫星制造、航天器结构和材料等方面优势明显，其工业承建了国际空间站多个舱段和Orion飞船欧洲服务舱的重要部件。意大利也有自主的中型运载火箭维加（Vega，由意大利主导研制）。商业上，意大利支持太空资源开发（立法保障商业开采权）并培育新创公司。 Italy is a major European space power with a strong industrial base. It is a key ESA member and excels in satellite manufacturing, spacecraft structures, and materials. Italian industry built modules for the ISS and contributes significantly to Orion’s European Service Module. Italy also leads the development of the Vega small launch vehicle. Commercially, Italy has pioneered space resources legislation and nurtures startups in the space resources and services sector. | 军用航天注重双重用途：意大利将许多航天资产军民两用化，例如Cosmo-SkyMed合成孔径雷达卫星既服务民生又供国防成像侦察。意军还运营意法合作的军用通信卫星（Sicral系列）。作为北约成员，意大利正成立太空作战指挥部，加强太空态势感知和盟军协同。意大利无独立反卫星武器，但参与欧盟/北约的太空安全倡议，并签署不试验ASAT承诺 。 Italy’s military space approach emphasizes dual-use assets. For example, the Cosmo-SkyMed SAR satellite constellation serves civilian needs and provides imagery for defense reconnaissance. Italy also operates military communications satellites (Sicral) sometimes in collaboration with France. As a NATO member, Italy is establishing a space operations command and enhancing SSA capabilities in concert with allies. Italy has no independent ASAT weapon, but it supports EU/NATO space security efforts and has joined the moratorium on ASAT tests . | Artemis参与度高：意大利是最早签署Artemis协定的国家之一（2020年） 。作为欧洲贡献的重要部分，意大利的航空航天公司（如Thales Alenia Space）承担月球门户空间站居住舱I-Hab的主要建造工作，并在Orion欧洲服务舱中提供结构件。意大利亦与NASA签署双边协议，拟开发月面居住模块等设施，谋求本国宇航员未来登月机会。此外，意大利在Artemis I任务中提供了立方体卫星ArgoMoon，用于拍摄火箭级分离情况 。这些体现了意大利在Artemis中的深度介入。 Italy, an original Artemis signatory (2020) , is heavily involved in the program. Through ESA, Italian industry (e.g. Thales Alenia Space) is leading construction of the Lunar Gateway’s I-Hab habitation module and providing components for Orion’s European Service Module. Italy also signed bilateral arrangements with NASA to potentially develop lunar surface habitation modules, aiming to secure an opportunity for an Italian astronaut on a future lunar mission. Notably, Italy contributed the ArgoMoon cubesat to Artemis I to image spacecraft separation . These efforts underline Italy’s deep engagement in Artemis. | 紧密对接美国政策，同时保留欧洲自主性：意大利高度支持美国的深空探索倡议，是首批认可美方太空资源利用立场的国家（其2017年国内立法亦允许商业开采太空资源）。作为北约与欧盟国家，意在太空安全上与美国一致，并加入美国的太空外交倡议。然而，作为欧洲一员，意大利也注重ESA框架下的多边合作和平衡。在整体方向上，意大利对美国主导的规范持拥护态度，在具体合作上兼顾欧盟战略自主。 Italy strongly supports U.S. space initiatives, being among the first to endorse the U.S. stance on space resources (Italy’s own 2017 law permits commercial space mining). As a NATO and EU member, Italy aligns with the U.S. on space security and participates in U.S.-led diplomatic initiatives in space. At the same time, Italy values multilateral cooperation via ESA and seeks to balance European strategic autonomy. Overall, Italy embraces U.S.-led norms while maintaining engagement through European frameworks. | 在美中之间寻求平衡：意大利过去曾与中国在航天领域有接触，例如签署政府间合作谅解备忘录，将在嫦娥六号月球采样任务中搭载意大利小型探测仪 。但作为美盟友，意在敏感领域对华合作持谨慎态度。2019年意曾加入中国“一带一路”倡议，签署包括航天合作在内协议，但近来政府转向大西洋主义，趋向与美一致。总体来看，意大利在与中国合作上有所涉及科学层面项目，但在战略航天项目上仍以西方联盟为主。 Italy has attempted to balance relations, with some engagement with China in space. For instance, an Italian small science instrument is slated to fly on China’s Chang’e-6 lunar sample-return mission . However, as a U.S. ally, Italy remains cautious about extensive cooperation with China in sensitive areas. Italy joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2019 with an MoU including space, but its latest government is pivoting back toward a pro-Atlantic stance. In summary, Italy has participated in a few scientific collaborations with China, but for major space endeavors it continues to prioritize Western alliances. |
| 卢森堡 (Luxembourg) | 小国大志的商业航天中心：卢森堡虽国土小但在航天领域独具特色。政府早在20世纪打造国际卫星通信公司SES，使卢森堡成为卫星运营强国之一。近年卢森堡将重点放在太空资源开采和新空间经济上，2017年立法保障私人采矿权，吸引全球太空采矿企业落户 。卢森堡航天局支持商业项目，无大型科研或发射能力，但其金融和法律环境使其成为航天创业高地。 Luxembourg is a small country with big ambitions in space commerce. It fostered SES, a leading global satellite operator, making it a powerhouse in satellite communications. In recent years, Luxembourg has focused on space resources and the new space economy, passing a 2017 law granting private companies rights to space mining, which attracted space resource firms . The Luxembourg Space Agency backs commercial projects; it lacks heavy R&D or launch capabilities, but its financial and legal environment makes it a hub for space startups. | 军事航天能力几乎为空白：卢森堡没有独立的军事航天项目，也无军用卫星系统。但作为北约成员，其政府曾出资与盟国合作采购通讯卫星（LU/SES与美国合作的GovSat-1卫星用于军事和政府通信）。卢森堡国防主要依赖联盟体系，在太空安全领域也主要通过与欧盟和北约伙伴共享资源实现。 Luxembourg has virtually no national military space assets or programs. It does not operate military satellites by itself, though it co-funded a governmental communications satellite (GovSat-1, a partnership with SES and NATO allies for military/government comms). Luxembourg’s defense relies on alliance frameworks, and its approach to space security is through sharing allied capabilities rather than developing its own. | Artemis的支持者和规则塑造者：卢森堡是Artemis协定首批签署国之一（2020年） 。其主要贡献在于推动太空资源利用原则的形成——卢森堡的法律和倡议与协定中允许月球资源开采的精神一致 。在具体任务上，卢森堡没有提供硬件，但其科研机构参与月球资源开采技术研究，可望在Artemis相关的采矿、ISRU实验中扮演角色。卢森堡也通过外交场合积极倡导Artemis原则。 Luxembourg, a founding Artemis Accords signatory (2020) , supports Artemis primarily in the normative and commercial realm, especially shaping principles for space resource utilization. Luxembourg’s national legislation aligns with Artemis Accords’ endorsement of lunar resource extraction . While it has not contributed hardware to Artemis missions, Luxembourg’s researchers are involved in technology studies for space mining and ISRU (in-situ resource utilization), potentially playing roles in resource-related experiments under Artemis. Diplomatically, Luxembourg is an active champion of the Artemis principles. | 高度符合美国倡导的太空经济政策：卢森堡的太空政策以商业和国际合作为导向，与美国鼓励私营部门开发太空的理念一致。其在空间资源法律上的突破获得美国认可，并促成美卢于2022年签署太空合作谅解备忘录，深化两国在商业航天和资源利用方面的协作。卢森堡在国际空间法讨论中常支持美国和盟友立场，是美国太空政策的积极伙伴。 Luxembourg’s space approach centers on commerce and international cooperation, aligning with the U.S. philosophy of encouraging private sector space development. Its pioneering space resource law was welcomed by the U.S., and a U.S.–Luxembourg MoU on space cooperation (signed 2022) deepens collaboration in commercial space and resource utilization. In international space law fora, Luxembourg often supports U.S. and allied positions, acting as an active partner to U.S. space policy objectives. | 与中国交往有限：卢森堡在航天领域与中国鲜有直接合作。其侧重商业及法律创新，而中国航天以国家项目为主，双方交集不多。卢森堡的卫星运营和金融服务或有中国客户（如卫星转发器租用等商业关系），但政府层面未与中国签署重大航天合作协议。因卢森堡航天重点与美国高度契合，在敏感技术和投资上对中国也相对谨慎。 Luxembourg’s direct engagement with China in space is minimal. Luxembourg focuses on commercial and legal innovation, whereas China’s program is state-driven; there is little overlap. Luxembourg’s satellite operators and financial services might have Chinese clients (e.g. leasing transponders), but at the government level no significant space agreements with China are noted. Given Luxembourg’s alignment with U.S.-led initiatives, it remains cautious with China in sensitive tech and investments. |
| 阿拉伯联合酋长国 (UAE) | 快速崛起的新兴航天国家：阿联酋近年大力投资航天科技，组建航天局（UAESA）并成功实施火星探测（“希望”号探测器，2020年发射）。阿联酋已发射多颗遥感和通信卫星，并培养本国航天员（已2人赴国际空间站）。其商业航天生态亦在发展，包括与外国企业合作研制月球车等。作为中东航天领军者，阿联酋具备相当的政府推动和资金实力，技术主要靠国际合作获取。 The UAE is a rapidly rising space nation. It established a space agency and successfully launched the “Hope” Mars probe in 2020. The UAE has several Earth observation and communications satellites and has trained domestic astronauts (two have flown to the ISS). Its nascent space industry is growing, exemplified by projects like developing lunar rovers via international partnerships. As a regional leader, the UAE’s program is backed by strong government support and funding, with much of its technology acquired through global cooperation. | 军事航天蓄势待发：阿联酋重视太空在国防中的作用，已部署军民两用的卫星通信系统（如Yahsat）和高分辨率成像卫星（如法国协助建造的“鹰眼”光学侦察卫星）用于安保。 虽然阿联酋尚未建立独立的太空军，但已将太空纳入国家安全战略，并与美国探讨导弹预警卫星合作。其军事航天能力目前主要依赖采购国外技术，但凭借财政实力，有潜力迅速增强。 The UAE is gearing up in military space. It operates dual-use satellite communications (Yahsat) and high-resolution imaging satellites (the “Falcon Eye” electro-optical spy satellites built with French assistance) for security purposes. While the UAE hasn’t created a separate space force, it has integrated space into its national security strategy and has discussed partnering with the U.S. on missile early-warning satellites. Its military space capability largely relies on foreign technology now, but with ample resources the UAE has the potential to expand these capabilities quickly. | 积极参与Artemis：阿联酋于2020年加入协定，成为首批中东签署国 。在Artemis框架下，阿联酋与NASA等合作意愿强，例如其宇航员参加美国商业载人任务赴ISS。阿联酋原计划让“拉希德2号”月球车搭乘中国嫦娥七号，但因美国技术管制受阻 ；随后阿联酋转而通过美国商业着陆器执行此任务 。这表明阿联酋希望同时参与多边（月球）合作。未来阿联酋可能通过资助或提供有效载荷，争取在Artemis月面任务中扮演更显著角色。 The UAE signed the Accords in 2020 as one of the first Middle Eastern nations . It is eager to participate in Artemis activities; for instance, a UAE astronaut flew to the ISS via a U.S. commercial crew mission. The UAE initially planned to send its “Rashid-2” rover on China’s Chang’e-7 mission, but U.S. export restrictions blocked that collaboration . The UAE then pivoted to flying the rover on a U.S. commercial lander under NASA’s CLPS program . This demonstrates the UAE’s interest in engaging on multiple fronts. Going forward, the UAE may leverage its funding or provide payloads to secure a more prominent role in Artemis lunar missions. | 在美中之间灵活平衡：阿联酋在太空政策上总体倾向与美国协调（例如其航天员训练、深空探测与美合作密切），也接受美国技术指导。然而，阿联酋亦追求自主和多元合作，包括曾与中国签署月球探索合作协议（如2017年签MOU，共同设想载荷搭载） 。但鉴于美国技术主导地位，阿联酋实际执行中更依赖美欧伙伴。可以说，阿联酋在符合同盟期望的同时，也试图从包括中国在内的多方获取机会，只是受制于西方管制，其平衡策略面临挑战。 The UAE’s space alignment leans toward the U.S., as seen in its astronaut training and deep-space projects largely done with U.S. support. However, the UAE also pursues autonomy and diversified partnerships, including a lunar exploration MOU with China in 2017 (for cooperation on Chang’e missions) . In practice, given Western dominance in cutting-edge space tech, the UAE relies more on U.S. and European partners. In essence, the UAE tries to balance satisfying its Western allies with exploring opportunities involving China, though Western export controls have made this balancing act challenging. | 与中国：合作与限制并存：阿联酋曾与中国在航天有若干合作亮点，如协助搭载沙特/阿联酋载荷于嫦娥四号任务、签署联合训练航天员谅解备忘录等。但美国的限制措施（如ITAR）对阿联酋参与中国项目造成阻碍 。尽管阿联酋对参与中国空间站或月球基地表示兴趣，其与中国的合作深度受到美方影响。展望未来，阿联酋可能在不违反西方限制的前提下，与中国开展科学数据共享等低敏感度合作，但高端载人和深空合作或将谨慎推进。 UAE–China space cooperation has seen some highlights (e.g. the UAE/Saudi camera on China’s Chang’e-4 relay, MOUs on astronaut training), but U.S. export rules (ITAR) have directly impeded UAE participation in Chinese missions . The UAE has signaled interest in China’s space station or lunar base opportunities, yet the extent of cooperation is constrained by its Western ties. Going forward, the UAE may engage China in areas like data exchange or basic research (that don’t trigger Western restrictions), but high-profile collaboration in human spaceflight or deep-space projects will likely be approached cautiously. |
| 乌克兰 (Ukraine) | 工业底子深厚但受损：乌克兰继承了前苏联重要航天工业（如“南方设计局”擅长火箭研制）和发射设施规划，但近年受经济和战乱影响，民用航天能力大幅削弱。战前乌克兰曾能制造中型运载火箭（如“天顶”Zenit），也参与国际海上发射等项目。近年其空间活动聚焦于小型卫星制造和与欧美合作（如为NASA提供火箭发动机部件等）。俄乌冲突对其航天工业打击严重，但乌克兰仍有技术人才储备。 Ukraine inherited substantial Soviet aerospace infrastructure (e.g. Yuzhnoye Design Bureau known for launch vehicle design) but its civil space capabilities have been severely impacted by economic difficulties and war. Before the war, Ukraine built medium rockets like Zenit and participated in Sea Launch. In recent years it pivoted to small satellite manufacturing and partnerships with the West (e.g. supplying rocket components to NASA’s Antares rocket). The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has badly damaged its space industry, though Ukraine retains significant technical expertise. | 军事航天几乎空白：乌克兰没有独立部署军用卫星系统。其军事曾依赖商业卫星图像和盟友情报支援（战时大量借助美欧商业卫星及Starlink通信 ）。乌克兰具备制造弹道导弹的底子，但在太空监视或导弹预警等方面无自主能力。俄乌战争爆发后，乌克兰迫切需要外部卫星资源支持，这也加速其与西方国家的太空安全合作对接。 Ukraine has virtually no indigenous military satellite assets. Its military relies on commercial satellite imagery and allied intelligence (indeed during the war it has heavily utilized U.S./European commercial imaging and Starlink communications ). Ukraine has ballistic missile know-how, but no autonomous capability in space-based reconnaissance or missile warning. Since the war, Ukraine has depended on external satellite support, which has accelerated its integration with Western space security cooperation. | Artemis参与象征意义大于实际：乌克兰是2020年较早签署协定的国家 。签署时乌克兰希望利用其航天工业为Artemis提供部件（如曾讨论提供登月着陆器部件或舱段），但2022年战争使这些计划停滞。尽管如此，NASA等对乌克兰表示欢迎，其签署更多具有政治象征意义，彰显乌克兰向西方全面靠拢。当前乌克兰直接参与Artemis任务的工作很有限，仅可能通过与ESA合作的项目间接参与。 Ukraine signed the Artemis Accords relatively early in November 2020 . At the time, Ukraine hoped to contribute its space industry expertise to Artemis (there were discussions of providing lander components or spacecraft parts), but the 2022 war has stalled such plans. Nevertheless, NASA welcomed Ukraine’s commitment; Ukraine’s participation is largely symbolic, underscoring its westward alignment. At present, Ukraine’s direct role in Artemis missions is minimal – any involvement would likely be indirect, possibly via cooperative projects with ESA partners. | 全面倒向美欧轨道：乌克兰的太空政策因地缘剧变完全倒向美国和欧洲阵营。苏联解体后直到2010年代，乌克兰也曾与俄罗斯、中国在航天上有合作（如向中国出售航天器技术、与俄联合研制运载火箭等），但自克里米亚危机及全面战争后，这些合作断绝。如今乌克兰谋求加入欧盟和北约，其太空领域将与西方深度融合（包括签署Artemis协定、寻求欧盟太空项目支持等）。 Ukraine’s space orientation has shifted entirely to the U.S.-European sphere due to geopolitical upheaval. In the post-Soviet era up to the 2010s, Ukraine also cooperated with Russia and China in space (e.g. selling spacecraft technology to China, jointly developing launchers with Russia), but since the Crimea crisis and the full-scale war, those ties have severed. Now seeking EU and NATO membership, Ukraine is integrating with Western space efforts (signing Artemis Accords, looking for support from EU space programs, etc.). | 与中国几无往来：冷战后乌中曾有一定航天交易（如90年代乌克兰向中国提供运载火箭发动机试验台等技术），但近年几乎没有新合作。中国在俄乌战争中立场偏俄，这也限制了中乌官方航天交流。乌克兰目前完全依赖西方支持，无意也无力与中国开展航天项目。可以预见，在可见的将来，中乌航天关系将保持疏远状态。 Ukraine has virtually no ongoing space dealings with China. After the Cold War, there were some transactions (e.g. Ukraine provided China with a rocket engine test stand in the 1990s), but in recent years there’s been little collaboration. China’s stance leaning toward Russia in the war further limits official space contacts. Ukraine currently relies wholly on Western support and has neither incentive nor capacity to engage in projects with China. In the foreseeable future, Ukraine–China space relations are likely to remain distant. |
| 韩国 (South Korea) | 后起之秀，技术迅速进步：韩国近年投入大量资源发展航天，韩国航空宇宙研究院（KARI）已研制并试射“世界”号（Nuri）运载火箭，成功进入卫星发射自给国行列（2022年首射入轨）。韩国还于2022年发射首个月球轨道探测器“丹努里” 。其卫星工业在通信、遥感小卫星领域活跃，多家企业崛起。2023年韩国设立国家宇宙航空厅（KASA），显示政府决心 。整体上，韩 civil航天正处于由追赶向自主创新的阶段。 South Korea is a rising space player, rapidly advancing its technology. KARI (Korea Aerospace Research Institute) developed and successfully launched the Nuri (KSLV-II) rocket, achieving independent orbital launch capability in 2022. South Korea also launched its first lunar orbiter “Danuri” (KPLO) in 2022 . Its satellite industry is active in comms and remote-sensing smallsats, with several new companies emerging. In 2023, South Korea created a national space agency (KASA), underscoring its commitment . South Korea’s civil space program is transitioning from catching-up to original innovation. | 军用航天起步阶段：韩国将太空纳入“杀链”防御体系，正发展侦察卫星以监视朝鲜。过去韩军无自有侦察卫星，主要依赖美提供情报，但2020年代开始韩国计划部署多颗光学/雷达侦察微卫星星座。韩国空军建立了小型太空作战组，并与美国太空军合作培训人员。韩国成功试射“卫星杀伤弹道导弹”（2019年反卫星试验）使其具备基础ASAT能力，但韩国已承诺不再进行破坏性ASAT试验。总体而言，韩军事航天仍有限，但在美支持下快速成长。 South Korea’s military space capability is in its early stages. Seoul considers space part of its “Kill Chain” strategy for preemptive defense and is developing reconnaissance satellites to monitor North Korea. Historically reliant on U.S. intel (as it had no indigenous spy satellites), South Korea in the 2020s is deploying its own constellation of optical and radar surveillance microsatellites. The Republic of Korea Air Force has a small Space Operations unit and cooperates with the U.S. Space Force for training. South Korea demonstrated a rudimentary ASAT capability with a ballistic missile test in 2019, but it has pledged not to conduct any destructive ASAT tests going forward. In summary, while its military space assets remain limited, South Korea’s capabilities are growing quickly with U.S. support. | 加入Artemis并贡献探月：韩国于2021年5月签署协定 。其表现突出的是成功研制“丹努里”月球探测器并搭载NASA仪器，于2022年进入月轨，为Artemis月球探索提供科学数据 。韩国寻求更深入参与Artemis：计划2030年前研制月球着陆器，并可能在Gateway或登月任务中争取韩国宇航员席位（已在韩美峰会提出意向）。韩国与NASA签有月球探测合作协议，是Artemis计划中非常活跃的亚洲伙伴之一。 South Korea signed the Artemis Accords in May 2021 . It has made tangible contributions to lunar exploration by developing the “Danuri” lunar orbiter (KPLO), which carries a NASA instrument and entered lunar orbit in 2022, supplying scientific data for Artemis-related goals . South Korea is seeking deeper Artemis involvement: it aims to develop a lunar lander by 2030 and has expressed interest (during a U.S.–ROK summit) in securing a Korean astronaut slot on the Gateway or lunar missions. Seoul and NASA have agreements on lunar exploration cooperation, making South Korea one of the most active Asian partners in Artemis. | 紧跟美国太空政策：韩美同盟使韩国在太空治理和安全上与美高度一致。韩国支持美国提出的太空规则，2022年宣布加入不进行ASAT试验行列。韩国于2023年加入美主导的“太空安全伙伴”对话，与美日等讨论太空威胁应对。韩国将NASA视为主要合作对象，在太空经济、探月、卫星导航增强等方面积极对接美方资源。可以说韩国的太空战略深受美韩同盟框架影响。 South Korea’s space policy is closely aligned with the U.S. due to the strong alliance. Seoul supports U.S.-led space norms and in 2022 joined the pledge against destructive ASAT tests. In 2023, it joined U.S.-led space security dialogues with allies (e.g. the Space Security Dialogue with U.S. and Japan) to address orbital threats. South Korea regards NASA as its primary partner and actively engages with U.S. programs in space economy, lunar exploration, and GPS augmentation. In essence, South Korea’s space strategy is heavily shaped by the U.S.–ROK alliance framework. | 对华合作有限且敏感：受地缘政治和韩朝紧张局势影响，韩国在航天上对中国态度谨慎。两国没有重大航天合作项目；韩国更倾向与美国、日本合作来抗衡地区威胁。过去韩国学术界曾与中方在卫星遥感应用等方面有小交流，但在政府层面几乎无合作。韩国加入Artemis也被视为在太空领域选边美国阵营的标志。综上，韩中航天关系目前处于低调状态，韩国主要专注强化自身及与美日的合作能力。 South Korea remains cautious about space cooperation with China, influenced by regional security concerns (North Korea) and U.S. alliance considerations. There are no major ROK–PRC space projects; Seoul prefers to collaborate with the U.S. and Japan to address regional threats. In the past, some academic exchanges occurred (e.g. on satellite remote sensing applications), but at the governmental level there’s virtually no cooperation. South Korea’s accession to Artemis is seen as aligning with the U.S. camp in space. Thus, ROK–China space relations are subdued, with Seoul focused on building its own capacity and working with U.S./Japan. |
| 新西兰 (New Zealand) | 小型但独特的航天参与者：新西兰本土航天活动有限，但其地理位置使之成为火箭实验和发射的理想场地。美资背景的Rocket Lab公司在新西兰设发射场，定期将小卫星送入轨道，使新西兰成为商业航天发射重地之一。政府成立了新西兰航天局（2016年）负责监管商业发射和推动航天科研。新西兰大学也参与立方星研发。总体而言，新西兰扮演商业航天基础设施提供者的角色。 New Zealand has a modest domestic space program but occupies a unique niche. Its geography makes it an ideal launch site: U.S.-affiliated Rocket Lab operates a launch range in NZ, regularly orbiting small satellites and turning New Zealand into a key hub for commercial launches. The government set up the NZ Space Agency (2016) to regulate launches and promote research. NZ universities build CubeSats as well. In sum, New Zealand serves primarily as an enabler of commercial space infrastructure. | 无独立军事太空能力：新西兰没有军用卫星或太空武器计划。作为“五眼”情报联盟成员，它依赖盟国提供卫星侦察和导航服务。新西兰国防力量近年来关注太空态势感知，在本土架设了监测设备并与美澳合作获取太空物态信息。整体看，军事航天并非新西兰防务重点，但其战略环境促使其支持盟友的太空军事行动（如共享侦察数据）。 *New Zealand has no proprietary military satellites or space weapons. As part of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, it relies on partners for satellite reconnaissance and navigation. The NZ Defence Force has shown interest in space domain awareness, setting up some tracking sensors domestically and partnering with the U.S. and Australia for space object information. Overall, space is not a primary focus for NZ’s defense, but its strategic ties mean it supports allied military space activities (e.g. by sharing reconnaissance data). * | Artemis贡献主要在商用发射：新西兰于2021年5月签署协定 。其参与Artemis最显著的是提供火箭实验和小卫星支持：Artemis I任务的一颗验证月球轨道的CubeSat（CAPSTONE）由Rocket Lab在新西兰发射 。新西兰航天局亦加入NASA月球任务工作组，提供政策和法规支持。虽然新西兰自身不开发探月硬件，但通过其商业火箭和地面站为Artemis任务做出了贡献。 New Zealand signed the Accords in May 2021 . Its main Artemis-related contribution comes via commercial launch and smallsat support: NASA’s CAPSTONE CubeSat, which verified Gateway’s lunar orbit, was launched from New Zealand by Rocket Lab . The NZ Space Agency also participates in Artemis working groups, lending policy and regulatory expertise. While NZ isn’t developing lunar hardware itself, it contributes to Artemis through its commercial launch services and ground stations. | 政策上紧随盟友：新西兰在太空政策上与美澳立场一致，强调开放透明和商业利用。作为无核及和平传统国家，新西兰支持防止太空军备竞赛，赞同避免破坏性太空行为。其签署Artemis协定正表明其支持美国的太空准则架构。此外，新西兰与美国签有航天领域合作安排，共享发射许可经验。总体来说，新西兰的太空治理态度与西方盟友保持一致。 New Zealand’s space policy aligns with its allies (U.S., Australia), emphasizing transparency, open access, and commercial utilization of space. Known for its non-nuclear, peaceful stance, NZ supports preventing an arms race in space and avoiding destructive behavior. By signing Artemis, Wellington affirmed U.S.-led norms. NZ and the U.S. have arrangements to cooperate on space launch regulation and research. In essence, New Zealand’s approach to space governance is in harmony with Western allies. | 基本无对华合作：新西兰虽与中国在贸易上关系密切，但在航天高科技领域几乎无合作。火箭实验等涉及美国技术的领域也受限于对华出口管制。新西兰在五眼框架下对中国高科技渗透保持警惕，曾禁止华为5G等。因此在航天合作上，新西兰基本站在美国一边，未参与中国空间站或探月项目，也未见双方有实质合作协议。 *Despite close trade ties, New Zealand has virtually no cooperation with China in high-tech space fields. Its rocket launch sector involves U.S. technology and is subject to export controls vis-à-vis China. Within the Five Eyes alliance, NZ is wary of Chinese tech influence (e.g. banning Huawei 5G). Thus, in space, NZ stands firmly with the U.S. and hasn’t engaged with China’s space station or lunar programs, nor are there notable bilateral agreements in space. * |
表注：以上涵盖截至2026年1月签署《阿耳忒弥斯协定》的主要国家。其余签署国（包括波兰、墨西哥、法国、德国、尼日利亚、巴西、沙特、阿根廷、埃及等）均遵循类似分析模式，这里因篇幅未一一列出。关于所有61个签署国的详细信息和出处，请参见附后的文献来源。
总结报告（中文）
截至2026年1月，《阿耳忒弥斯协定》签署国已扩展至61个国家 。这些签署国涵盖欧美传统航天强国、新兴航天国家以及发展中国家，各国在航天技术实力、军事太空投入、参与Artemis计划程度、对美政策契合度和对华关系上表现出明显差异。总体而言：
民用航天技术能力：签署国中，美国、欧洲主要国家（如法国、德国、意大利、英国）、日本等具备雄厚的航天研发和制造能力，在火箭发射、人类航天、深空探测等领域处于领先地位 。例如，美国拥有全面的深空探测计划和商业航天产业；欧洲借助欧空局形成整体实力；日本、加拿大则在机器人、卫星等方面特色明显。另一批国家如澳大利亚、阿联酋、韩国正迅速追赶，成功实施火箭发射或行星探测，实现从零到一的突破 。同时，不少发展中国家（如卢森堡、巴西、墨西哥、波兰等）航天规模较小，多侧重卫星应用或国际合作获取技术。
军事航天能力：签署国在太空军事化上的投入分化显著 。美国以绝对优势领先，独立组建太空军，部署全球导航、导弹预警和通信卫星，并发展反卫星和太空电子战能力 。少数盟国（法国、日本、英国、印度等）也陆续成立太空司令部或部队，投入数十亿美元增强军事卫星和太空态势感知能力 。例如，法国投资60亿欧元升级军用侦察与通信星座 ；日本、德国、加拿大等也制定了太空安全计划并与美国协调行动 。相反，大部分签署发展中国家军事航天几乎为空白（如新西兰、卢森堡、墨西哥等无专门军用卫星），更多通过加入美国或北约的合作获取太空安全服务。
参与Artemis计划程度：协定明确签署并不强制参与NASA登月项目，但许多签署国主动贡献力量 。美国作为主导方承担了Artemis的大部分核心任务和硬件开发。主要伙伴如欧洲（ESA成员国）、日本、加拿大则通过提供关键硬件（例如欧洲服务舱、日本Gateway舱段、加拿大机械臂）换取宇航员席位和联合飞行机会 。澳大利亚、阿联酋等也利用各自优势参与：澳研制月球车辅助资源利用 ；阿联酋最初计划月球车通过中方发射受阻后，改由美国商业着陆器执行 。另外，韩国成功发射月球轨道器搭载NASA载荷，为Artemis前期探测提供数据 。相比之下，多数签署国由于技术或资金限制直接参与有限，它们更多是在政治和原则上支持协定，将来可能通过人员培训、科学实验等方式间接参与。
与美国太空政策的契合度：绝大部分协定签署国在太空规范上选择与美国保持一致。这体现在：1）支持基于《外层空间条约》并由美国倡导的深空探索原则，如透明、互操作、资源利用 ；2）积极加入美国发起的倡议，如承诺不进行破坏性反卫星试验 （截至2025年底已有近20国签诺，包括加拿大、日本、德国、英国等）；3）与美国签署双边太空合作协议，在航天局合作、空间安全信息共享等方面靠拢美国。欧洲盟国和日本、加拿大、澳大利亚等同美国几乎步调一致。即使一些发展中国家（阿联酋、巴西等）也把与NASA合作作为重心。总体而言，签署Artemis协定已成为美国凝聚志同道合国家的象征——美国国务院称这些国家构成了和平探索太空的“共同愿景”联盟 。
与中国的双边航天关系：签署Artemis协定在一定程度上反映出当前全球太空合作格局的分野。协定签署国几乎无一参与中国/俄主导的月球科研站倡议，反之亦然 。中国和俄罗斯之外的多数主要航天国家都已加入Artemis阵营。大部分签署国近年来在航天上与中国的合作较为有限，有的甚至明显减少：例如澳大利亚终止了中国使用其跟踪站的协议 ；英国、新西兰等严格限制对华高科技合作。然而，这并不意味着签署国与中国完全隔绝。一些国家仍保持科研层面的交往或早前达成的小项目合作：如法国、意大利、瑞典等欧洲国家在中国月球探测器上搭载了科学载荷 ；沙特通过与中国合作在嫦娥四号中继星上搭载相机 ；泰国、塞内加尔甚至同时出现在Artemis协定和中俄月球科研站合作名单中 。但可以预见，在美中战略竞争加剧背景下，签署Artemis协定的国家整体上倾向于与美国深度合作、与中国竞争或保持距离 。中国官方也对协定持怀疑甚至批评态度，认为这是美国意图主导太空规则、排挤中俄的举措 。
综上所述，《阿耳忒弥斯协定》签署国涵盖了全球多数积极从事太空活动的国家。通过该协定，美国成功构建了一个广泛的伙伴网络，共同认可一系列太空行为准则 。各签署国各取所需：或获取参与美国月球计划的机会，或借助协定提升本国航天名望。而从更宏观角度看，Artemis协定国家集团的形成已对21世纪太空地缘政治版图产生深远影响——美主导的深空探索联盟与中俄主导的合作体系呈现出彼此平行竞争的态势 。这种分野既反映了当今国际关系格局在太空领域的投射，也将深刻影响未来月球与深空开发的合作模式和规则演变。
各国的发展状况也表明，太空不再是少数超级大国的专属领域。通过国际合作和规则框架，中等国家和新兴经济体也能分享太空探索的成果并贡献力量（例如巴西与NASA合作开发月球技术、尼日利亚通过协定获得航天培训机会等）。同时，太空军事化的风险促使越来越多国家在协定框架下承诺约束军事行为，维护太空公共域的可持续性 。
当然，协定签署国本身在技术能力和利益诉求上参差不齐，这对未来如何协调各方在Artemis计划中的角色、以及如何与非签署国（尤其是中国、俄罗斯）开展对话，都提出了挑战。截至2026年初，Artemis协定已成为美国主导太空秩序的核心工具之一，其成员国在航天活动各方面大体上与美国保持一致。这既巩固了美国在新一轮月球竞赛中的领导地位，也意味着全球太空合作格局正因大国竞争而呈现出阵营化特点 。如何在这一背景下确保和平、可持续的太空开发，将是协定成员和国际社会共同面临的重要课题。
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